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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the “MSc in Energy Law, Business, 
Regulation & Policy” at the International Hellenic University of Thessaloniki, Greece. 
It examines the parameters that have to be taken into account for Greece to 
become a European energy hub for natural gas. The addition of the Eastern-
Mediterranean pipeline to the existing Greek gas network will attain this goal. 
However, the significance of the project may destabilize the balance of power 
enjoyed until now by Greece’s neighbouring countries. Geopolitics will help us 
estimate the chances of consent for undisturbed construction, operation and 
exploitation of the project. The perspective benefits for all the involved countries, i.e. 
Greece, Cyprus, Israel and EU are definitely multiple. East-Med will enhance gas 
diversification for EU and help upgrade its energy role globally.  
By the present note I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Sandro 
Furlan, whose valuable assistance, contribution and suggestions enabled me to write 
this thesis. 
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PREFACE 
 
Geopolitics is a methodology that allows us to define, analyze and understand 
the interactions between geography, demography, economics and international 
relations. It is a useful tool for every country to investigate its advantages and 
disadvantages against other countries, mostly neighbouring ones, i.e. to see its role in a 
wider framework of political and diplomatic actions or omissions.  
 
In the Middle East the world is divided in strong and weak states that influence 
or endure the power of the stronger ones under retention of sovereignty. Energy 
resources are one cause for this distinction between producer countries and the ones 
that need energy supplies. This dependence usually creates international relations that 
are based on long – lasting balance of power that hardly changes. Energy abundance or 
scarcity has played the role of a modern armor that accordingly discriminates states in 
strong (producer) and weak ones (those who luck energy resources).  
 
New reserves of natural gas have been found in the off-shore area of Israel 
which wishes to be connected with EU through the Eastern – Mediterranean (East-Med) 
pipeline to supply it with natural gas. The route of the project will pass through Cyprus 
and Greece. Given the fact that Greece is financially dependent from external lending, it 
surely wants to strengthen its significance and power towards its European partners by 
providing them the energy security that they need. Does geopolitics favour this 
connection? What does the EU energy policy foresees regarding this project? Does 
Greece meet the preconditions for becoming an energy hub of natural gas for the 
European Union? Is there an alternative transmission route to the original course of the 
East-Med? What is the role of Turkey? Will it implicitly provide its consent or will it set 
preconditions to the construction of the project?  
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I.- INTRODUCTION  
The present study envisages in examining how feasible is the construction of the 
Eastern – Mediterranean (East-Med) pipeline which will bring natural gas from the 
reserves of the Levantine Basin (Israel) to the Cypriot and afterwards Greek National 
Natural Gas System (NNGS), and finally to Italy and other South East European 
countries1. The realization of East – Med in combination with other projects already in 
function or drafted is studies of the EU as PCIs, will turn Greece into a transit energy 
hub of significant importance for the energy efficiency of the EU in the eastern 
Mediterranean.  
However, there are deep asymmetric threats regarding the deep economic 
recession which ravages the country since 2009, forcing it to ask for huge external 
financing in order to survive insolvency proceedings and an exit from the European 
Zone. Moreover, tax evasion hinders investors’ interest weakening Greece’s position in 
relation to its neighbours, who attract the interest of big exploration companies that 
compete against each other for finding and exploiting natural resources in eastern 
Mediterranean. 
East – Med’s construction and unobstructed operation definitely requires 
adjacent countries’ consent, such as Turkey and Russia, as the balance of power in the 
region will eventually change in favour of Greece and Cyprus. Historically, both the 
latter retain a fragile relationship with Turkey which at times culminates into becoming 
unabatedly hostile even until today. Additionally, the level of political and economic 
relations of Russia with Greece and Cyprus must be investigated, particularly after 
Russia’s long-lasting turmoil with both EU and Turkey. Furthermore, Israel for its own 
geopolitical reasons needs to remain a valuable partner for EU in eastern 
Mediterranean and maintain cooperation with it in as much as possible different fields.  
There are also strong emerging gas supplier countries, such as Iran, that pursue 
EU’s collaboration for trading their own natural gas.  
The analysis of all the above issues requires constant briefing, as bilateral and 
international relations are a live organism that keeps changing constantly.  
 
                                                             
1 http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/eastmed 
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II.- BRIEF INTRODUCTION ON GREECE 
Greece is located at the south east extreme of the European Union, at the 
crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa2. It is one of the geostrategic junctions of Eurasia, 
the “World Island” according to the “Theory of Heartland” of Halford Mackinder. It is 
the European connecting point between the east and the west, the north and the 
south. Its location transformed it into a bridge for transnational sea commerce and 
favoured the development of one of the most powerful merchant fleets of the world. It 
belongs to Eurasia which consists of strong civilizations, fundamental religions, 
abundant energy resources and powerful industries of Europe, Russia, China, Japan and 
Korea. Its geostrategic value3 has been the cause of foreign territorial claims since 
ancient times and moreover the reason for financing it from Troika4 (later renamed as 
“Institutions”) in order to exclude a possibility of a Grexit.  
Geographically it consists of long mountainous volumes, long coastline of 
13,676 km in length5, large peninsulas and numerous islands in the Aegean and the 
Ionian seas. This geomorphology allows it to be protected from the north from 
possible external intrusions whereas its seas grant it the advantage to stay connected 
with Asian and African countries. Geography offers Greece mild climate conditions 
where survival for people has been easy and thus, has favoured civilization to grow 
and develop6. Greeks easily naturalized in mainland and island geomorphology and 
adopted an open minded view towards mankind and the best possible political and 
social conditions for organizing its life. 
 
Greece’s political mentality and democratic principles7 inevitably led the county 
to join in the European Community in 19798 and later the EU. Its national believes are 
                                                             
2
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greece 
3
 Greece’s geostrategic importance for NATO is established through the US and NATO military bases to 
refuel their operations n the Middle East; retrieved from: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ 
natosource/the-geostrategic-value-of-greece-and-sweden-in-the-current-struggle-between-russia-and-
nato 
4 The European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
5 Ibid 2 
6 Kaplan D. Robert, “The revenge of geography: what the map tells us about coming conflicts and the 
battle  against  fate”,  Random  House,  New  York,  2012,  Chapter  IX:  The  Geography  of European 
Divisions 
7 They have been strongly emphasized by the American President Obama during his two day trip in 
Greece in November 15-16, 2016 
8 The act of accession was ratified by the Greek Parliament in 28-6-1979 and began its enforcement in 1-
1-1981. 
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thoroughly aligned with the objectives of the European Union as stated in the treaties 
of the Union. Greece transposes primary and secondary European law into national 
legal order. In this framework it has also adopted the EU energy policy as stated in the 
articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) for the security of supply 
(Article 122 TFEU), energy networks (170-172 TFEU), the internal energy market (Article 
114 TFEU) and the external energy policy (Articles 216-218 TFEU)9. Specifically, it has 
introduced the Regulations and Directives concerning the liberalization of the energy 
market that was stated by three Energy Packages regarding electricity, natural gas and 
renewable energy sources. From the Third Energy Package, Directives 2009/72/EC and 
2009/73/EC were introduced to the Greek legislation by Law 4001/2011 (in force from 
22-8-2011), whereas Regulations (EC) 713/2009, 714/2009 and 715/2009 apply directly. 
Finally, the National Regulatory Authority was established by Law 2773/1999 in 
compliance to Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC10 
Since 2009 Greece suffers an economic crisis which forced it to sign three loan 
agreements (memorandums for the support of the economy)11 for heavy financing of 
approximately 280 euro coming from the European Commission, the European Central 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Huge public and private sector 
indebtedness, overinvestment in housing and overconsumption12 are indicatively a 
few of the factors that led Greek economy to a collapse. The economy shrank by a 
quarter in five years13, severe austerity measures and excessive taxation was imposed 
upon taxpayers, employees and pensioners were harshly attacked by cut down wages 
and pensions, which reduced consumption power for the wide majority of the 
population. The shrinking of both wholesale and retail market along with the limited 
access to bank financing did not allow small14 and medium15 size enterprises (mostly in 
commerce and construction sector) to cover fixed operating expenses and taxes. 
During the last seven years 229.000 enterprises closed producing unemployment for 
                                                             
9  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.7.1.html 
10
 http://www.rae.gr/site/categories_new/about_rae/intro.csp 
11
 Which were voted by the Greek Parliament in May 6, 2010, February 2, 2012 and August 14, 2015 
12 http://www.kathimerini.gr/824685/article/oikonomia/epixeirhseis/se-mia-eptaetia-ekleisan-229000-
mikres-kai-mesaies-epixeirhseis-sthn-ellada 
13 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/international/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html 
14 Up to 50 employees 
15
 Up to 250 employees 
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700.000 people16 affecting gradually but severely the social structure of the society by 
merely extinguishing the middle class. Excessive taxation and deregulation of the 
economy continue until today to create a toxic economic environment as new tax laws 
are constantly introduced discouraging domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors 
to create business opportunities in Greece. For once more in the history of the country 
economic immigration abroad has been a social phenomenon of mainly young and 
middle aged work force in search of a better life.  
Finally, Greece has 11.3 million inhabitants17 most of whom live in two major 
cities, Athens and Thessaloniki. According to recent demographic statistics its 
population is aging due to limited birth rate18 stressing even more state economy by 
higher public expenditure for the health system. The demographic problem is 
causally linked with the economic crisis, salary reduction, and over-taxation. The 
latter in conjunction with huge unemployment and economic immigration create 
pessimistic perspectives for future financial recovery. In any situation, Greece has 
officially declared and her creditors have largely acknowledged that the country’s 
debt is not sustainable. 
 
III.- EVOLUTION OF NATURAL GAS SECTOR AT EUROPEAN LEVEL – 
EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY STRATEGY 
A) Historically, after the construction through vertically integrated monopolistic 
companies, of the primary national energy networks that served energy supply and 
demand within national borders in Western Europe, United States, Canada etc. and 
the turbulent international situation that was created in 1970s with the Yom Kippur 
War and the Iranian Revolution which caused long fluctuations in oil supplies coming 
from the traditional producer countries of the Middle East, it became clear that 
                                                             
   16 Ibid 12 
17 Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Greece 2011 Review”, International Energy Agency, OECD/IEA; 
retrieved from: https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Greece2011 
unsecured.pdf,  p. 17  
18 http://www.iefimerida.gr/news/134124/new-york-times-%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%81%CE%AC%CF%83  
%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BF-%CF%84%CE%BF-%CE%B4%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE%BF%CE%B3%CF%81%CE% 
B1%CF%86%CE%B9%CE%BA%CF%8C-%CF%80%CF%81%CF%8C%CE%B2%CE%BB%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE 
%B1-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BD-%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B1-%CF%83 
% CE%B5-%CE%BB%CE%AF%CE%B3%CE%B1-%CF%87%CF%81%CF%8C%CE%BD%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CE 
   %AF%CF%83%CF%89%CF%82-%CE%BD%CE%B1-%CE%BC%CE%B7%CE%BD-%CE%B5  
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security of supply was the most significant factor for the operation of countries’ 
economies worldwide, which became more vulnerable to interruptions of energy 
supplies for the production of electricity. Very soon along with oil and coal, natural gas 
was categorized as a basic source for the production of electricity, heating and 
transportation.  
At European level after both the first and the second World Wars a huge 
reconstruction period followed turning Europe into a global player19 that needed to 
retain its decisive role on the world chessboard. After the two oil crises of 1973-1974 
and 1978-1979 and their multilevel effects on global demand and supply of oil, as well 
as due to the OPEC’s decision to cut oil production and increase market prices20, 
Europe realized that maintaining a secure energy system was an issue of international 
dimensions as it was dependent on external suppliers. Therefore, it chose to reduce its 
oil dependency. Diversifying its energy resources and expanding its infrastructure 
towards abundant reserves of fossil-fuels became an end in itself. This strategy led 
causally to the option of natural gas, whose resources could be easily found in the 
adjacent Algeria, Norway and Russia21, 22 that transported gas to the heart of Europe 
through off-shore and on-shore pipelines and long-term contracts of bound capacity.  
Additionally to the traditional (merely national) transportation system of natural 
gas, LNG terminals23, re-gasification and storage facilities were introduced to the 
European gas network and reinforced it. The EU adopted a clear “gas first strategy”24 
perspective on the basis of which the need for new gas infrastructure was promoted 
through funding coming from the Future European Fund for Strategic Investments 
                                                             
19 “A Secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy”, Brussels, 12 December, 2003, p. 1 
20 Giulio Enjo, “Oil and gas industry: history, structure, prices”, slides from the course “Energy 
Economics”, of the Master “MSc in Energy Law, Business, Regulation and Policy”, International Hellenic 
University  
21 Gas supplies to EU in 2006 accounted for 42% for Russia, 27% for Norway and 18% for Algeria. 
According to future forecasts for the year 2030 these figures are estimated to be 29% for Russia, 16% for 
Algeria and 15% for Norway; Ghiles Francis, “Algeria: A Strategic Gas Partner for Europe”, 19-2- 2009, 
retrieved from http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=176: algeria-a-
strategic-gas-partner-for -europe&catid=92:issuecontent&Itemid=341  
22 Bothe, D. & Seeliger, A.: “Forecasting European Gas Supply Selected Results from EUGAS Model and 
Historical Verificaton”, EWI Working Paper, Cologne 2005, p. 8-9 
23
 According to Gas Infrastructure European data, around the whole Europe, there are 203 LNG 
operational terminals, 23 under construction and 146 planned; Pr. Furlan Sandro, “Energy Union and LNG 
Strategy” slides from the course “Energy, Transport & Storage”, of the Master “MSc in Energy Law, 
Business, Regulation and Policy”, International Hellenic University 
24 Raines Thomas and Tomlinson Shane, “Europe’s Energy Union: Foreign Policy Implications for Energy 
Security, Climate and Competitiveness; retrieved from https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/ 
files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-03-31-europe-energy-union-raines-tomlinson. pdf, p. 13 
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(EFSI), as well as from European financial institutions25. In order to set the legal basis 
of expanding natural gas networks outside national borders to be interconnected and 
transformed into a European transnational gas network that could better cover 
increasing demand caused both by rapid economic and demographic growth, the 
European Parliament and the Council established Regulation (EU) 994/2010 
concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply that repealed the former 
Council Directive 2004/67/ec. This legislation was enacted in the framework of the EU 
energy policies for the provision of secure energy supplies26. 
New infrastructure projects increased energy security and diversity for EU that 
soon became the world’s second largest consumer of natural gas with a share of 
16,3%27 which in 2011 was equivalent of 50% imports. Although economic recession 
and switch to renewable energy sources for the production of electricity28 led to a 
declining trend of gas consumption since 2009, reaching the lower levels of 199529, EU 
future consumption is expected to range from 472bcm to 652bcm by 2030 according 
to the European Commission’s demand scenario30, as EU is a fast growing economy31 
whose needs demand further energy consumption to be satisfied.  
Initially, the operation of the gas market was based on traditional long-term 
contracts. However, reduced consumption created a surplus of gas capacity that was 
channeled by suppliers and traded in gas hubs. Competition favoured increased 
participation of energy players in these transactions that in its own turn led to a 
renegotiation (regarding the longitude and the prices) of long-term gas contracts and 
the gradual decoupling of gas prices from the oil ones. Nonetheless, decoupling was 
limited to a certain percentage, leaving space for a further future decline in contract 
gas prices from the oil-based price dependence. All these factors ended in gas 
producers becoming gradually isolated from the liberalized functioning of the gas 
                                                             
25 Ibid 24, p. 13             
26 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy 
27
 Is the Qatar-Iraq-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas Pipeline Project Feasible? An Analysis with Regards to 
International Energy Market Policies and Risks”, Report No:23, January 2011, Center for Middle Eastern 
Strategic Studies (OSRAM), p. 7 
28
 Taylor Pamela, Clifton Suzanne “EU Gas Market Liberalization”; retrieved from: www.fticonsulting.com 
29 Dave Jones, Manon Dufour, Jonathan Gaventa “Europe’s declining gas demand: Trends and Facts on 
European Gas Consumption”, report, June 2015, p. 5 
30 “Energy   corridors   European   Union   and   Neighbouring   countries”,   European     Commission, 
Directorate-General for Research - Sustainable Energy Systems, http://www.energy.eu/publications/ 
KINA22581ENC_002.pdf, p. 7  
31
 Clô A. 2000, “Oil economics and policy”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 29 
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market between suppliers and distributors, whose increased trade raised the need 
for new infrastructure. However, producers cannot afford to make capital intense 
investments due to decreased revenues. Divergent trends emerged, i.e. demand for 
more gas increased, prices dropped and infrastructure became more expensive for 
producers. Additionally to the above, the recent political instability in EU relations 
with Russia after the Ukrainian crisis of 2009 threatened the flow of gas supplies to 
Europe and spread again significant uncertainty in the Community about the level of 
future EU gas demand32 and the possibility of satisfying it. The issue of energy 
security, namely, the unstoppable, reliable, safe and accessible supply at affordable 
prices33 in a competitive environment for suppliers’ operation34, became imminent.  
In order to respond to the crisis the EU opted for expanding imports of 
European gas apart from Norway, North Africa and Russia, to other producer 
countries from which gas in huge quantities can be easily transmitted to the existing 
market. 
B) To better serve the European Energy Security Strategy and energy policy 
objectives, namely to increase competitiveness, reinforce security of supply, protect 
the environment35, and safeguard each Member-State’s access to gas36, the 
European Commission conducted studies for new pipelines to be connected with the 
already operating EU gas network. The role of Trans European Energy Networks was 
reviewed and considered integral for the overall development of the EU network. 
Moreover, the Energy Union37 was established to further serve a gas integrated38 
market in order to include the import of supplies from new resources for even more 
diversification. Investments of 126 billion euro39 were approved for the construction 
of new infrastructure of gas pipelines and LNG terminals connecting EU to Middle 
                                                             
32 Ibid 30, p. 4   
33 “Energy Supply Security 2014”, OECD/IEA, retrieved from http:www.iea.org 
34 Ibid 26  
35 Ibid 30, p. 15  
36 “Towards Energy Union: The Commission presents sustainable energy security package”, European 
Commission - Press Release, 16-2-2016, p. 16; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-307en.htm 
37
 Maroš Šefčovič the European Commissioner responsible for the Energy Union, has said that he sees 
2016 as ‘the year of delivery for the Energy Union’: Malcolm Keay & David Bucham, “Europe’s Energy 
Union: a problem of governance”, November 2015, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies; retrieved 
from: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Europes-Energy-Union-a-
problem-of-governance.pdf 
38 Ibid 26  
39
 Ibid 30, p. 7    
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East40, as well as storage facilities, liquefaction and gasification terminals. Regulation 
347/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council (the “new TEN-E Regulation) 
on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure41 set rules to mobilize joint 
cooperation of both national TSOs and European organs42 for the implementation of 
12 strategic trans-European energy infrastructure priorities43 for the construction of 
Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) for the period up to 202044, each one of which 
may be comprised by several lines, pipelines, facilities, equipments or installations45. 
Finally, the Union developed a list46 of PCIs that met the criteria of being necessary 
for at least one of the energy infrastructure priority corridors and areas47 that their 
potential benefits outweigh the costs48 for their construction.  
 
IV.- THE EASTERN-MEDITERRANEAN GAS PIPELINE 
A) The Eastern-Mediterranean natural gas pipeline (known as “East-Med 
Pipeline” with the code number No 7.3.1.49), has been included in the European 
Union’s updated50 second51 list of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs)52 to guarantee 
the EU’s energy supply needs, to boost its diversification of energy resources and 
transport routes53 and to help it achieve its goals for climate change and lower 
                                                             
40 Ibid 30, p. 7    
41 OJ L 115, 25.4.2013, p.39, as applicable under REGULATION (EU) No 1391/2013 
42 The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (the “Agency”), the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G), and the European Commission 
43
 Regulation 347/2013, preamble 20 
44
 Regulation 1391/2013, preamble 1 
45 Regulation 347/2013, Article 2, par. 3 
46
 According to Regulation 347/2013, preamble 24 “the Union list should be established every two years” 
47 According to Annex I, Regulation 347/2013, a priority gas corridor is the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) 
which includes, inter alia, infrastructure for the transmission of gas from the Middle East and Eastern 
Mediterranean to the Union. Two of the Member States concerned are Cyprus and Greece  
48 Regulation 347/2013, Article 4, par. 1 
49 Pertaining to the cluster of gas infrastructures and associated equipment for the transportation of new 
sources of gas from the offshore fields in the East Mediterranean, according to the Annex of the 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1391/2013, of 14 October 2013, amending Regulation (EU) No 
347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy 
infrastructure as regards the Union list of projects of common interest 
50 The  EU  adopted  a  list  of  195 PCIs which  is updated  from  the  one  adopted  in  October  2013; 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-unveils-list-195-key-energy-infrastructure-projects  
51 “A direct link to new sources for Europe”; retrieved from http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/eastmed 
52 “ANNEX  to  COMMISSION  DELEGATED  REGULATION  (EU)  …/...  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No 
347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the Union list of projects of common 
interest”, Brussels, 18.11.2015 C(2015) 8052 final  
53 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-unveils-list-195-key-energy-infrastructure- 
Projects  
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emission targets54. Being a PCI, East-Med consists an integral part in the 
implementation of Regulation (EU) No 347/2013, as it meets the general criteria 
stated in Article 4 of the Regulation and is considered being a part55 of the Priority 
corridor Southern Gas Corridor ('SGC') of the EU. It pertains to the EU’s plan for the 
optimization of the European market of gas, and particularly to the projects that will 
link EU with its neighbouring countries, in the specific case Israel56, for the 
strengthening of security and stability57 by creating ties of political cooperation and 
deep economic integration58. It has also been included in the last Ten Years 
Development Plan (TYNDP)59.  
B) East-Med will be constructed in the Levantine Basin60 near the shores of 
Israel. Its delivery capacity to Europe will range from 8bcm to 14bcm per year61. Gas 
will be extracted from the Leviathan field of 3-5Tcm explored natural gas62 in the 
southeastern part of the Mediterranean, and transported through 1.200 km off- 
shore and 500 km on-shore pipelines to Cyprus (Vassilikos), Crete and from Greece (it 
will be imported in Peloponnese63 and transported to the northwestern District of 
Epirus) to Italy64 through the IGI Poseidon pipeline65. According to the Pre-FEED 
(Front-End-Engineering Design) studies66, 67, which are already completed by 
                                                             
54 The EU is committed to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions for a rate of 80-95% at the levels of 1990 
until 2050; “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions”, Brussels, 15.12.2011 COM (2011) 
885 final, p. 2  
55 https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/projects-by-common-interest/ 
energy -priority-corridor-7  
56
 Israel belongs to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
57 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/neighbourhood_policy/index_en.htm  
58 https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp/330/european-neighbourhood- 
policy-enp.en  
59
 http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/eastmed  
60
 The Levantine Sea is bordered by Turkey in the north, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Gaza Strip in the 
east, Egypt and Libya in the south, and the Aegean Sea in the northwest:  retrieved  from https://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Libyan_Sea. 
61 http://www.depa.gr/index3.php/content/article/002005008/552.html  
62
 http://www.igi-poseidon.com/ 
63 However alternative routes have also been proposed. For further details please see: 
http://drrichswier.com/2016/01/29/greece-cyprus-and-israel-to-build-eastern-mediterranean-gas-
pipeline/ 
64 “EU looking towards East Med gas reserves” retrieved April 25, 2016 from Newswire 
65 IGI Poseidon pipeline will be 207 km long, with a capacity of 14-20bcm per year and the possibility of 
reverse flow. In June 9, 2016 a Cooperation Agreement was signed between US Noble Energy 
International Ltd and IGI Poseidon S.A for its construction 
66 Namely the Technical Feasibility Studies, the Reconnaissance Marine Survey, the Economic, Financial  
and Competitiveness  Studies; retrieved  from: https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe- 
facility/cef-energy /projects-by-country/multi-country/7.3.1-0025-elcy-s-m-15  
67 According to DEPA, in May 11, 2015 the IGI Poseidon S.A. assigned a consortium of major engineering 
companies (IntecSea and C&M Engineering) to conduct the technical studies Pre-FEED 
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IntecSea, C & M Engineering and HIS-CERA68, despite the main challenges of the 
project, namely the long length and the deep water69, East-Med is technically 
feasible70, 71 and economically viable72. Financially, it will be supported by the EU 
through the Connect Europe Facility (CEF) co-financing programme73 which has 
already granted 2 million euro (the 50%) for the studies’ cost. The project 
construction cost is estimated to be over 20 billion USD74. The pipeline is expected to 
be fully operational in 202075 despite the initial estimation for delivery in December 
201776. 
 
http://www.thecypriotpuzzle.org/israel-pitches-massive-natural-gas-pipeline-plan-to-europe-passingby-
cyprus/ 
 
                                                             
68 http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/media/main-outcomes-seminar-%E2%80%9Cstrategic-value- 
eastern-mediterranean-gas-resources-and-eastmed  
69 IGI Poseidon, “Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline” retrieved from: 
http://www.depa.gr/uploads/files/poseidon/Eastmed%20pipeline%20for%20PCIs_ENG_final.pdf 
70 The Greek Public Gas Company (DEPA) reached the same conclusion in the studies it conducted in 
2011-2012 
71 Similar pipelines will be built up in the Mediterranean. Edison will build up GALSI pipeline to connect 
Algeria to Sardinia and then to Italy (Piombino) and carry out 8bcm of natural gas per year. Galsi will be 
the deepest underwater pipeline. Another comparable pipeline is the Medgaz that has been constructed 
by company Medgaz to connect through deepwater of 2,160 meters from Algeria to Spain and transport 
8bcm of natural gas per year. Both the prior mentioned projects were characterized of their strategic 
importance for the safe supply of Europe and comprised gas hubs in Italy and Spain respectively.  
72
 Ibid 51 
73
http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/media/igi-poseidon-and-noble-sign-cooperation-agreement-relation- 
finalization-pre-feed-activities  
74 Ibid 63  
75 http://www.depa.gr/index3.php/content/article/002005008/552.html  
76 Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Pipeline-Pre-FEED Studies, European Commission 
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C) The project is strongly promoted from all the involved parties, namely the 
European Union, Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Italy, as the benefits of the project will be 
a reliable connection with the European market, diversification of gas supplies, and 
furthermore economic development from the incoming revenues for the involved 
countries. Confirmation has been repetitively renewed on the highest political level.  
 
 
V.- THE GREEK ENERGY GAS PROFILE  
 
At the end of the 1980s Greece intensified legislative reformation for the 
establishment of the proper legal framework regarding energy institutions and 
organs in order to comply with European energy rules. It adopted a natural gas 
perspective to diversify its energy resources and reduce pollution coming from oil 
and coal.  
In 1988 the Greek Public Gas Company (DEPA), a state majority company, was 
founded to execute and manage the Bilateral Agreement for the supply of Greece 
with natural gas from the Soviet Union77. In 1999 the National Regulatory Authority 
(NRA/RAE in Greek) for energy was founded (Law 2773/1999) as an independent 
authority with the competence to monitor the national energy market, propose to 
the State the proper measures for the operation and the liberalization of electricity 
and natural gas markets, etc78. Law 4001/2011 upgraded the role of NRA (RAE) by 
granting it a distinct legal personality and financial autonomy79, transposed into 
national legislation the Third Energy Package Directives of electricity and natural gas 
and liberalized the market from the monopoly regime to the competition market 
conditions80. However there is still more liberalization to be done on the Greek 
energy markets.  
During the 1990s Greece was connected to the European gas-grid81. The 
National Natural Gas System (NNGS)/ESFA in Greek) consists of 512 km on-shore high 
                                                             
77 http://www.depa.gr/content/article/002001008/64.html  
78 http://www.rae.gr/site/categories_new/about_rae/intro.csp 
79 Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Greece 2011 Review”, International Energy Agency, OECD/IEA; 
retrieved from: https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Greece2011unsecured. 
pdf, p. 22   
80 Panagos C. Theodore, “Handbook of Energy Law”, International Hellenic University, Thessaloniki 
2015, p. 40, par. 159  
81
 Ibid 22, p. 8 
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pressure (36’’ and 30’’ diameter82) pipelines, plus 947 km of transmission branches of 
medium and low pressure that transport gas from the Greek-Bulgarian (TSO 
BULGARTRANSGAZ) and Greek-Turkish (TSO BOTAS) borders to consumers83. ESFA 
has 3 entry stations for natural gas. The first entry point of 3.6 bcm technical capacity 
is located in Promachonas village (Sidirokastro, District of Central Macedonia) where 
gas coming from Russia is transposed to ESFA through the Bulgarian NNGS; the 
second is located in Agia Triada (Megara gulf84, District of Athens) where LNG coming 
from Algeria is regasified and inserted from Revithoussa island through off-shore 
pipelines; and the third of 1 bcm technical capacity, is situated at Kipi 
(Alexandroupolis, District of West Thrace) where gas is imported from the Turkish 
NNGS coming from the Middle East and the Caspian region85. ESFA has 41 exit points 
that connect the main backbone pipeline with Distribution Networks in the regions of 
Attica, Magnisia, Central and Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. Apart from the 
pipelines, ESFA comprises of metering, compression and regulating stations and 
other complementary infrastructure. The Hellenic Gas Transmission System Operator 
(DESFA in Greek)86 is responsible for the Greek NNGS (ESFA) operation, expansion, 
maintenance etc.  
DEPA dominates the market87 and supplies ESFA with natural gas88 from 
Russia (54%) through the Trans-Balkan pipeline89, Turkey (17%) through the Greek-
Turkish Interconnector90 and Algeria (20%)91 through long-term contracts and spot 
LNG purchases92. Greece depends exclusively on gas imports to cover its gas needs; 
this fact renders the whole gas system dependent on unpredictable external factors 
that can cause its collapse should a crisis break up93. Diversification for LNG has been 
achieved to the level that DEPA has signed agreements with ENI, BP, Shell and also a 
                                                             
82
 Operation Report of the NNGS for the Year 2015.pdf, p. 3 
83
 http://www.desfa.gr/?page_id=3278&lang=en 
84
 http://whessoe.co.uk/experience/lng-tanks/revithoussa-expansion-project-greece/ 
85
 Ibid 79, p. 75         
86 It was established by Law 3428/2005 as a 100% subsidiary of DEPA   
87 Ibid 79, p. 74         
88 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_countryreports_greece.pdf  
89
 Stambolis Costis, “Greece’s Geopolitical Gamble to become a Regional Energy Hub is facing stiff 
resistance”; retrieved from: http://www.iene.eu/greeces-geopolitical-gamble-to-become-a-regional- 
energy-hub-is-facing-stiff-resistance-p1769.htm 
90 Ibid 89   
91 Ibid 79, p. 69  
92 Ibid 79, p. 72 
93
 In case of a crisis analogous to the one that happened in Ukraine 
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Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Qatar94. According to 2012 EU’s 
statistics for Greece, in 2012 gas consumption reached 14.1%95 from the overall 
27.04Mtoe of domestic consumption, namely 3,7856Mtoe, showing a decrease of 
2.9% compared to 201196. From this amount a percentage of 23.5% was used for the 
production of electricity.  
Natural gas has gained Greek consumers’ confidence for its economic fees 
and its better heating performance in comparison to oil. Since May 2011 new 
suppliers and large consumers entered the gas market97 and competition conditions 
developed. Natural gas is used for power generation 64%, industry 22%, residential 
9%, services and transport 5%98. Finally, DESFA forecasts that demand will increase in 
the future reaching 6.6bcm in 2019, mostly for electricity generation99. 
 
VI.- THE NATIONAL NATURAL GAS SYSTEM (NNGS) 
Nowadays Greece has a significant network of gas transmission, mostly 
located at the northern part of the country (Macedonia and Thrace), which is 
indicatively composed of:  
a) The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) which gained the consent all of the 
involved parties. Russia approved TAP for having low capacity (10 to maximum 
20bcm) and will be able to cover a limited percentage of European gas needs (7 
million households) that in 2014 amounted to 500bcm100, in comparison to the 
Nabucco pipeline (31 bcm) which was strongly promoted by the US101 to reduce EU 
dependency on Russian gas. TAP will transport gas from the Shah Deniz 2 off-shore 
gas field in Azerbaijan that through Turkey and the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline 
(TANAP) will be imported to Greece and transported to Italy via Albania and the 
Adriatic Sea102. TAP is the European leg of the Southern Gas Corridor; it is 878km long 
and comprises of a 48 inches on-shore and a 36 inches off-shore width. Its 
construction was inaugurated by the Greek government in May 17, 2016. It is 
                                                             
94 Ibid 79, p. 72  
95  https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_countryreports_greece.pdf  
96
 Ibid 95  
97
 Ibid 79, p. 10  
98 Ibid 79, p. 71  
99 Ibid 79, p. 71  
100 Ibid 89  
101 Ibid 89  
102
 https://vimeo.com/158329267 
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expected to be fully operational at the beginning to 2020. 
b) The Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB pipeline) will provide a direct 
link103 between the national grid of Greece and Bulgaria104; it will be 180 km long and 
transport annually about 3bcm105 natural gas from Greece to Bulgaria with the 
potential to reach 5bcm per year. It will be further upgraded to offer physical and 
commercial reverse flow106. Being a Project of Common Interest it will be financed 
with 45 million euro from the European Energy Program for Recovery (EEPR), 
whereas the rest of the investment will be covered by the shareholders in “ICGB AD” 
consisting of Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD with 50% and IGI Poseidon with 50%107. 
The pipeline is strongly promoted by both countries108. Its estimated cost will be 250 
million euro109 and it is expected to be commercially operational by 2018110. 
 c) The Independent Natural Gas System (INGS) of Alexandroupolis is an off- 
shore permanent floating unit of four LNG storage tanks111 for the reception and 
regasification of LNG112 that connects with the on-shore Greek National Natural Gas 
System (NNGS) importing 6.1 billion cubic metres per year; it also has storage capacity 
of 170.000 cubic metres of LNG113 and its maximum regasification capacity reaches to 
700.00 nm3/h114. The whole project will also consist of subsea and onshore pipeline, 
metering and regulating station115 to be constructed by a joint venture scheme 
comprised by the Greek National Enterprise of Supply of Gas, the American Cheniere 
Energy and GASTRADE S.A.116; the project will transport American liquefied shale gas 
into the Bulgarian market through the Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) 
pipeline, and consequently in the trans-European gas networks. 
d) An LNG terminal located in Revithoussa Island located in the south sea area 
                                                             
103 http://www.icgb.eu/about/igb_project   
104
 Ibid 89 
105
 http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/igb 
106 Ibid 105   
107 http://www.icgb.eu/final-investment-decision  
108 http://www.icgb.eu/about/igb_project  
109 Ibid 103  
110 http://www.icgb.eu/about/shareholders  
111 http:/www.gastrade.gr/en/alexandroupolis-ings/the-floating-lng-reception,-storage-and-regasification 
-unit.aspx 
112 http://www.gastrade.gr/en  
113 http://www.gastrade.gr/en/the-company/the-project.aspx  
114 http://www.gastrade.gr/en/the-company/main-components-of-the-alexandroupolis-ings.aspx 
115 http://www.gastrade.gr/en/alexandroupolis-ings/metering-and-regulating-station.aspx  
116 Which received a license by the 29/25-7-2011decision of the Greek National Regulatory Authority 
(NRA); http://www.gastrade.gr/en/the-company/scope-and-objectives.aspx 
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of Athens that was completed in 1999 and became operational in February 2000. It 
consists of two already functioning storage reservoirs of total capacity 130.000 cm to 
be expanded by a third reservoir to 225 cm117; it has also unloading and gasification 
installations118. Liquefied natural gas coming from Algeria is inserted through two 
underwater pipelines, each one a back-up of the other, of 24’’ diameter each and of 
620 metres and 510 metres length, that connect the Revythoussa LNG Station 
through the mainland119 on-shore pipeline to the national gas grid (NNGS/ESFA) in 
the Pachi Gulf of Megara120. The Greek National Authority of the Supply of Gas 
(DEPA) has already held discussions with the US Cheniere for the transportation of 
American LNG to Revythoussa121. 
 e) According to the latest September 8-9, 2016 document of the high level 
meeting group on Central and South-Eastern European Gas Connectivity122 there is a 
plan for an additional LNG terminal in Northern Greece at the city of Kavala. 
 Finally, early in 2015 the Greek government made conducts with Russian 
president Vl. Putin123 to achieve an extension of the “Turkish Stream” pipeline that is 
designed to have capacity of 64bcm of natural gas, the 16bcm of which will be 
retained from Turkey124. “Turkish Stream” will transport Russian gas from Krasnodar 
through the Black Sea to the shores of Turkey, and then to Fyrom, Serbia and Europe 
where it will be connected with “Tesla” pipeline. In October 2016 presidents Putin 
and Erdogan signed in Istanbul a construction agreement during the World Energy 
Congress125. Greece aspires for a 450 km diversion of the pipeline that will traverse 
through the northern Greek Macedonia (the “Greek Stream”)126 before it is connected 
with Tesla in Hungary.  
 
 
                                                             
117 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revithoussa_LNG_Terminal 
118
 Ibid 82, p. 4 
119 Ibid 82,p. 4 
120 http://whessoe.co.uk/experience/lng-tanks/revithoussa-expansion-project-greece/  
121 Hatziioannou George, “Greece as an Energy Hub? There is the Rub!, retrieved April 22, 2016 from 
http://www.rcem.eu/posts/2016/april/22/energy-hub.aspx 
122 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/CESEC%202016.09.09%20HLG%20conclusio 
ns% 20-%20FINAL.PDF 
123
 http://www.wsj.com/articles/greece-to-sign-russian-gas-pipeline-deal-1434631581 
124 Ibid 89  
125 Maceas Bruno, “New Putin-Erdogan meeting paves the way for big changes”, October 13, 2016, 
retrieved from: http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/new-putin-erdogan-meeting-paves-way-big- 
changes 
126
 https://www.rt.com/business/248629-greece-russia-memorandum-pipeline/ 
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Greek National Natural Gas Pipeline System – Geophysical Map127 
 
 
 
                                                             
127 http://www.desfa.gr/?page_id=3278&lang=en 
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VII.- GREECE AS AN ENERGY HUB – BENEFITS FOR: THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, GREECE, CYPRUS & ISRAEL 
A) BENEFITS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION  
East-Med will help EU diversify its energy sources, achieve energy security of 
gas flow, make climate-change goals attainable, and reduce dependence from Russia. 
The imported gas will enhance market competition among engaged players.  
Last but not least, East-Med will provide natural gas to consumers in affordable 
prices, as transmission of gas through pipelines is cheaper in relation to LNG 
purchasing costs which consist of fuel cost, harbor fees, insurance charges etc.128. 
  
B) BENEFITS FOR GREECE 
The specific project will favour Greece in the following multiple ways: 
a) It will create a gas hub in the north east Peloponnese (District of Korinthos), 
where in the adjacent village Spathovouni there is currently a (DESFA) gas operation 
and maintenance centre129 which is connected with a 58 km of 30’’ and a 156 km of 24’’ 
diameter high pressure pipelines of the Greek NNGS. The centre consists of various 
supplementary infrastructures for normalizing the transmission of gas to consumers130.  
b) The overall impact of abundance of gas will cause chain reactions pursuant to 
the Greek gas market rules. Competition will increase, more players will enter the 
market to trade, more investments for infrastructure will be attracted, and direct or 
indirect employment will be created for approximately 2.000 people (engineers, 
technicians, workers)131 during the construction and the operation of the pipeline. New, 
supplementary to the backbone pipeline, projects will be constructed to interconnect to 
the on-shore parts of East-Med more towns of the provinces of Peloponnese, Sterea 
Ellada and Epirus, namely the west side of the country, which until today has no access 
to gas networks. These projects will bring more commercial activity to these areas and 
enhance their economies.  
c) Revenue coming from access fees to the national gas network (NNGS), from 
fees for the transportation of gas to Italian and European markets, as well as from 
                                                             
128 Zajdler Robert, “The importance of LNG transport costs”; retrieved from https://www.linkedin.com/ 
pulse/importance-lng-transport-costs-robert-zajdler-ph-d- 
129 http://www.desfa.gr/?page_id=3278&lang=en  
130
 Retrieved from Greek Sunday newspaper “Ethnos”, August 3, 2014 
131 Ibid 130  
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taxes, will influx the national treasury. Increased competition among suppliers will also 
benefit consumers who will enjoy cheaper gas prices and help raise their standard of 
living.  
d) The position of Greece will be upgraded within its European partners on 
geopolitical terms. The European Union will enhance its interest in peace and stability in 
the south-eastern Mediterranean. It is essential for example that Greece and EU 
cooperate politically and diplomatically to draw a security strategy in order to defend 
European borders against Turkish volatile stance towards relations of good 
neighbouring. Stability and peace will further promote energy trade in the eastern 
Mediterranean basin.  
e) Greece is a member of the EU, United Nations, NATO, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development etc. Simultaneously it is located between the 
east and the west where trade and international relations have been tightened due to 
globalization, and technological evolution which makes feasible the connection of 
distant energy producer countries of the Middle East, such as Iran132 and Qatar133 with 
the European Union.  
East-Med is not just another pipeline for Greece; on the contrary it is one of the 
most significant ones, as it will play a vital role for both the European Energy Strategy 
realization and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), because it will enable the 
interconnection of Europe with present and future gas reserves (of Israel, Cyprus and 
Lebanon) that are found in Eastern Mediterranean134. 
Should East-Med be aided to the aforementioned Greek gas network, it will 
enable Greece to become a producer of competition, security of supply and market 
integration in the southern Europe and the Balkans, namely a significant regional gas 
hub135 that will enhance the imported capacity of natural gas in the region and diversify 
its energy sources, suppliers and routes. Furthermore, it will oblige Greece to improve 
its foreign policy perspective into operating as a guarantor and a valuable ally of the 
                                                             
132 The Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline to transport 110 cubic metres of natural gas per day to Europe; retrieved 
from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran-Iraq-Syria_pipeline 
133 The Qatar-Turkey pipeline is designed to transport natural gas from Qatar via Saudi Arabian, Jordan, 
Syria (Al-Assad inhibits the realization of the project) and Turkey to Europe  
134
 Lagakos Alex and Tsakiridis Eyripidis, “East Med Pipeline: The “Game-Changer” Europe chooses to 
ignore” retrieved May 8, 2015 from http://www.naturalgasworld.com/east-med-pipeline-the-game- 
changer-europe-chooses-to-ignore-23628 
135 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_countryreports_greece.pdf  
 
 24 / 44  
nations and international oil and gas companies that want to combat terrorism from 
threatening the safety of, among others, pipeline networks constructed to transport 
energy to the west.  
 
C) BENEFITS FOR CYPRUS 
Cyprus needs to strengthen its political significance for the EU in order to 
mobilize its active interest in supporting a fair and equitable solution against Turkey’s 
territorial claims. Turkish illegal occupation of the northern part of the island remains 
an unresolved issue until today.  
Moreover, Cyprus has suffered economic recession and it was forced to ask for 
external financing of 10 billion euro from the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund136, in exchange for various 
structural reforms. An Economic Adjustment Programme was agreed on March 2013 
and despite the fact that Cyprus three years later (on March 2016) exited the 
Programme, it remains under a Post-Surveillance Programme until the repayment of 
the 75% of its financing137. Although economic growth and optimization of the 
banking sector’s operation have been significant, additional revenues from the 
exploitation of its natural resources (namely the Aphrodite offshore gas field located 
in the southern coast of Cyprus at the exploratory drilling block 12 in the country's 
maritime Exclusive Economic Zone138) and the transportation of natural gas through 
East-Med will further boost its trade and energy market.  
East- Med will turn Cyprus into a gateway for the security of energy supplies 
for Europe and an anchor for more future flows of natural gas from eastern 
Mediterranean Basin. 
 
D) BENEFITS FOR ISRAEL 
East-Med reinforces Israel’s strategic importance for Cyprus, Greece and the 
European Union. An alliance between them is already an undisputed fact. The project 
has also attracted the attention of Turkey who seeks to resolve its old hostilities with 
Israel and conclude a construction agreement for a pipeline that will traverse its own 
                                                             
136 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/cyprus/index_en.htm  
137 Ibid 136 
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territory to end up to EU borders. Israel keeps political contacts on the highest official 
level with all the aforementioned countries, as well as with Egypt and Jordan139.  
Long-lasting conflicts with the east made Israel redirect its foreign policy in 
order to gain multiple collaboration of the west and armor its territorial integrity in 
case of external dangers coming from adjacent countries. 
Additionally, unlike the past when Israel had a demographic problem of 
decreasing population that threatened to risk its future territorial integrity, due to 
Israeli - Palestinian conflict that kept producing human victims, during the last years 
there has been an annual population growth rate of 1,9%, according to 2015 
statistics140. This fact enforces Israeli government to fully exploit its energy resources 
in order to be able to cover national energy demand and to find new import markets 
to channel its gas production.  
Greece, as well as Cyprus, have maintained a good relationship with Israel over 
the years on many grounds, such as military, tourism and real estate projects141. In the 
future the three countries’ electricity grids will be connected by the “EuroAsia 
Interconnector” via a 1518km submarine power cable that EU has already characterized 
as a Project of Common Interest (PCI).  
All the tree countries (Greece, Cyprus and Israel) promote East-Med through 
bilateral or multilateral communications. In January 2016, after a Trilateral Summit held 
in Nicosia, the Prime Ministries of Cyprus, Israel and Greece issued a joint Declaration 
by which they confirmed their strong support to the East-Med project for the export of 
eastern Mediterranean gas to continental Europe142. Later on, the same determination 
was repeated in Athens, by the Greek and Israeli Defense Ministers, Panos Kammenos 
and Moshe Ya’alon, as well as by the Prime Ministers of the two countries in 
Jerusalem143.  
 
 
 
                                                             
139 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37692753 
140 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Israel  
141 “Cyprus-Israel relations”; retrieved from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus%E2%80%93Israel_ 
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VIII.- CHALLENGES TO BE ADDRESSED  
Greece is at the heart of rapid evolutions that take place in the Middle East 
during the last years and threaten peace, stability and even the geomorphology of 
existing states. The need for more access to energy resources and the finding of huge 
reserves in the region have intrigued tensions between states that either belong to the 
ones who have the luck to own the reserves, for example Syria144 or to those who 
desperately need access to them. This is the reason for reconsidering and re-
establishing bilateral or multilateral relations among traditional enemies145 to form 
otherwise unthinkable alliances in exchange of mutual withdrawals of power. 
Religion has also become a factor of either diversification from the west or 
reunification among Muslim countries, such as Turkey and Iran146 which, as arising 
middle-class countries147, want to demonstrate their power to the powerful west world. 
Religion is the cause and the motive to express dissatisfaction, rejection and 
disappointment for western rules, ethics, way of living and formulating societies, in 
which distinction between good and evil is loosened by allegedly civilized manners that 
repeatedly disqualify any notion of respect towards traditional values. Thus, Muslims 
feel confused, isolated, weak and unable to assimilate into the western societies, 
mostly because they are literally rejected. In the Muslim conscience religion becomes a 
reference point and turns into a weapon that distinguishes the believers from the 
atheists. It ends up being the reason to eradicate Muslims to change their fate and the 
course of the world. Punishment for the atheists comes through terrorist attacks that 
have caused hundreds of human casualties in European countries, Turkey etc. 
In addition to the above, radical conflicts from Muslim brotherhood, 
organized crime, trafficking in arms and drugs148 and the ongoing devastating war in 
Syria have caused movements of large amounts of immigrants to safer territories, 
such as Turkey, Greece and other EU countries.  
                                                             
144 According to the Oil& Gas Journal estimate Syria possessed 2.5 billion barrels of crude oil as of January 
2013; retrieved from: http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-oil-gas-little-known-facts-syrias-energy-resources-
russias-help-1402405 
145
 Israel and Turkey have been trying to re-establish a trade relation concerning natural gas due to the 
immense reserves found in the off-shore area of Israel 
146 Kaplan D. Robert, “The revenge of geography: what the map tells us about coming conflicts and the 
battle  against  fate”,  Random  House,  New  York,  2012,  Chapter XIV: The former Ottoman Empire  
147 Ibid 146 
148 Lesser O. Ian, “Greece’s New Geopolitical Environment”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 
vol 5, No 3, September 2005, p. 349 
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 All these challenges formulate an extremely dangerous and fragile blend 
whose political and diplomatic mismanagement could provoke a serious of events 
with unprecedented outcomes. 
 
IX.- GEOPOLITIC GAMBLING – GEOSTRATEGIC DECISIONS  
In order to consider whether East-Med will challenge the existing balance of 
power in the eastern Mediterranean, we have to estimate each country’s special 
geopolitical gravity and in particular its international relations with Greece. 
Should East-Med be constructed, Greece’s role will be upgraded to a valuable 
for EU regional transit energy hub that will diminish Turkey’s primary energy role as 
energy hub in the region, and downsize its prospective importance to be able to 
guarantee security of supply for Europe and the Balkans. In the long run this situation 
will alter the balance of power between traditional rivals, i.e. the Turkish and the 
Greek side (namely Greece and Cyprus). Until today Turkey has shown a rather 
authoritative stance in the evolutions that happen in the region, which often 
escalates to its military presence over the Aegean and against Greece, who keeps a 
low political and diplomatic profile to maintain a measure of peaceful co-existence 
with its neighbour. As long as Turkey is detained to complete isolation from the 
decision making field as regards the construction of East-Med, it is clearly predictable 
that it will not grant its consent freely and without asking a share of the benefits in 
exchange; otherwise, it will reject the project as completely unthinkable. 
Historically Greece and Turkey have maintained a turbulent relationship 
which ranged from mutual hostility149 to (temporal) reconciliation150, as none of the 
two has ever really accepted the autonomous existence of the other, mostly, on the 
waterside of the Aegean Sea. The geomorphology of the region around the Aegean 
Sea, since ancient times, has been extremely significant for economic prosperity and 
reign upon dependent regions from the north (Russia) that needed access to the 
Mediterranean, as well as from the east (Asia) and south (Africa) that looked for new 
markets to trade. 
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The international151 Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, put an end at military 
conflicts between Greece and Turkey and recognized Turkish sovereignty over 
specific borders, as they are known today, in exchange of its resignation for all other 
claims for the rest territories of the ex Ottoman Empire152. The Treaty obliged 1,3 
million Greeks to abandon their real estate in Turkey and immigrate to Greece and 
400.000 Turks to follow the opposite direction. The Treaty resolved all pending issues 
finally and irrevocably, and was ratified a month later by both Turkey and Greece. It is 
in force until today and according to international law, its provisions cannot be 
altered unless all signatories agree.  
In the years that followed 1923 the Aegean Dispute153 arose regarding the 
delimitation of territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones, use of 
continental shelf etc., namely the exercise of sovereignty (territorial waters) and 
jurisdiction (continental shelf and exclusive economic zone)154. By an Act of 
September 1936 Greece extended the breadth of its territorial waters from 3 nautical 
miles (nm) (5.6 km)155 to 6 nautical miles (11 km). In continuation, the April 29, 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, recognized the right for exploiting hydrocarbons 
in the continental shelf beyond the limit of territorial waters (Article 1, section a). 
Later, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that was 
signed in 1982 and came into force in 1994156, provided that the limit of territorial 
waters can be extended to 12 nautical miles (Article 3) and acknowledged for each 
(signatory) state the right of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nm to which a 
special legal regime applies (Part V, Article 55 and following), i.e. the right to utilize 
and explore maritime resources. In the case of Greece, an extension of territorial 
waters to 12 nm in the Aegean Sea would give it almost its full control, reducing the 
area of high sea to only 19.7%157, leaving Turkey with a small passage of sea to 
transport its ships. Turkey claims that the exercise of this right by Greece in the 
                                                             
151 Apart from the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty was signed by the British 
Empire, the French Republic, the Kingdom of Italy, the Empire of Japan and the Kingdom of Romania; 
retrieved from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Lausanne 
152 Ibid 151, reference  
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 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aegean_dispute 
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 Ortolland Didier, “The Greco-Turkish dispute over the Aegean Sea: a possible solution?”, April 10, 
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Aegean is illicit, and will be considered as a “casus belli”158, whereas the former has 
extended its territorial waters to 12 nm outside the Aegean Sea159. Greece contends 
that an extension to 12 nm is not only a treaty right but also a right of customary law, 
however it does not risk the exercise of this right due to fear for military conflict and 
war supremacy of Turkey, leaving unanswered the distinction between sovereignty 
and independence. Finally, Turkey claims that the insular shelf of the islands should 
be considered as an extension of the continental shelf of Asia Minor160 whereas 
Greece counter argues that each island has its own continental shelf, and the 
frontiers with Turkey should be defined on the basis of the median lines161.  
To intercept Turkish challenging of territorial and aerial borders that could 
easily escalate into armed conflict, such as in 1987 and 1996, Greece adopted the 
strategy of favouring Turkey’s accession prospects to the EU. In theory this strategy 
would expedite the urgent resolution of the Cypriot issue that Turkey’s joining of the 
EU would entail. In practice, it revealed other countries’ strong opposition to such a 
possibility162 and ceased to incriminate Greece as the number one opponent for 
Turkey’s EU membership. Moreover, it satisfied Greek economic, military and 
geopolitical interests, as Greek entrepreneurs have had long-lasting and strong 
economic ties with Turkey in all the three industries of agriculture, tourism and 
shipping. The development of a peaceful relation between the two countries 
definitely opened new market routes for mutual prosperity and wealth, and 
supposedly decreased military spending163 for both Greece and Turkey, that have 
been competing with each other in military supplies by consuming big portions of 
their GDPs164, instead of saving money to cover other unavoidable expenses for 
education, immigration, etc. Finally, Turkish integration in the EU would oblige it to 
                                                             
158 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs; retrieved from: http://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-
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160 Quoted in translation from the Greek language: Veremis Thanos, “The History of Greco-Turkish 
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comply with international and European law and obligations, accept the European 
borders and consequently the Greek ones and withdraw from territorial claims 
regarding the Aegean islands and from arguments relating to the rights of Turkish 
minority groups of West Thrace. This  geopolitical  gambling  has  been  drugged  
through  the  years  on  the  basis of accepting or rejecting, respectively, international 
treaties, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that 
was signed in 1982 and came into force in 1994. 
Despite Greece’s support for a prospect Turkish EU membership and the 
relevant EU-Turkey discussions that were intensified since 2005, reality proved that 
Turkey was virtually rejected by the EU165. The European counter-argumentation was 
based on Turkey’s violations of human rights with the Kurds being the most exemplary 
of all166, and illegal occupation of the northern part of Cyprus which the international 
community condemned jointly167. Additionally, Turkey was turned down for being a 
Muslim country. Yet, the lately announced possibility of introducing the death penalty 
as punishment in its judicial system has estranged even more the country from its 
European perspective. 
Since 2010, in response to EU’s rejection, Turkey adopted the policy of “zero 
problems” with its neighbours168 and headed towards the east, and mostly Iran, to 
form a collision against EU and USA. For the latter Turkey has been the 
counterbalance for Iranian military expansion, namely an obstacle against nuclear 
weapons, that could turn it into the dominant power in the Middle East. However, 
after suspension of talks with the EU, Turkey decided to support the nuclear plans of 
Iran in order to conclude agreements for oil and natural gas supplies169. 
Turkey’s political role in the region expanded further since president Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan decided to lead evolutions and impact on the political stance of the 
formerly subject to ex Ottoman Empire counties. This planning came as a sequence of 
its former Prime Minister’s (Ahmet Davutoğlu) strategy to increase Turkish influence 
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and transform Constantinople (Istanbul) into a political centre of Muslim countries. 
Since 2011 Turkey supported revolutionary regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and 
Yemen, and last but not least, rebels against the government of President Bashar al- 
Assad170 in Syria. Pr. Erdoğan’s goal was to establish a transnational international 
organization of democratic states in the Middle East and North Africa171 under his 
auspices, in analogy of the European Union. However, Turkish plans for Syria found 
strong opposition of the legal regime of the country. After the long-lasting Syrian war, 
thousands of casualties and persecuted unarmed citizens, thousands of refugee floods 
to safer countries, etc., Turkish role in the devastation of Syria was exposed and 
Erdoğan’s popularity was diminished. Instead of serving its role as a geopolitical factor 
of stability, Turkey proved to the world that it prefers eradication and conflict refuting 
the “zero problems” policy and caused by itself irrevocable damage to its 
trustworthiness towards the international community.  
After the failed July 2016 coup d’etat, Turkey entered a three month state of 
emergency during which extended clearings of thousands of government officials, 
military officers, etc. were ordered, leaving national military practically headless and 
weak. Imbalance seems to jeopardize even the delivery of aerial military equipment in 
2018. Over time Turkish regime becomes profoundly authoritarian, Islamic and less 
secular172 with the concentration of more executive power in the hands of Pr. Erdoğan 
by constitutional reform.  
In the interior Turkey suffers a thorough societal division, as proven betrayers or 
possible disputants are treated as “enemies”. The country is plagued by constant 
confrontation with the Kurdish party and the Kurdish insurgent groups that demand 
separation from Turkey173. These petitions cause hectic tensions to the government 
headquarters for a possible change of the country’s territorial borders and its 
consequent deprivation from huge energy resources174. Nationalism through 
territorial claims against neighbouring countries has been knowingly used to distract 
public opinion from the looming economic crisis that will soon affect the economy. 
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These facts, along with the ambivalent implementation of the March 20, 2016 
refugees’ agreement with the EU have decreased even more Turkey’s chances to 
accede to the EU. Finally, Turkish persistent demand’ from the US to deport Fethullah 
Gülen as the main instigator of the July 2016 coup d’etat, the cutting down of power 
to the US Incirlik airbase has further alienated Turkey-US relations after a long-lasting 
and multilevel supportive US stance for Turkey175.  
Turkey’s energy role has been significant for the European energy needs 
because it concentrates on its territory a network of natural gas pipelines such as Blue 
Stream, Turkey-Greece Interconnector, TANAP, Qatar-Turkey pipeline, etc. which 
connect it with Europe. Until now it enjoys being a primary energy gas hub for the 
latter and opposes every other possibility. 
To cover its own energy gas demand it imports the 99% in natural gas, 
depending on Russia for 55,3%, whereas the rest of its supplies come from Iran, 
Azerbaijan, Algeria and Nigeria176; it also represents a rapid demand growth177, which 
forces it to diversify its resources. Turkish Stream has been the cause of Turkey’s 
efforts (consultations with Vl. Putin were held in Istanbul, in October 2016 in the 
World Energy Congress) to optimize its relations with Russia for accomplishing the 
construction of the enormous pipeline, after the unfortunate incident of bombarding 
and shooting down the Russian military jet on November 2015 on – alleged - violation 
of Turkish airspace178 near the Syrian-Turkish borders179. The Russian economic 
embargo and restriction of trade and business transactions deprived Turkey from 
almost US 6bn in 2014 and 3.5bn in 2015180.  
However, Turkey dislikes dependence from Russian gas and thus looks with 
anticipation at the discoveries in Israel’s EEZ. Despite its traditionally hostile relations 
with the latter, Turkey recently began a diplomatic strategy to bridge differences with 
Israel in order to attain the construction of a pipeline that will connect the rich 
Leviathan reserves with its soil and in continuation with Europe. Consultations 
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between high officials of the two countries took place in June 2016181. A 
normalization of their relations seems to bear fruit after years of tension that 
followed the Israeli raid on May 22, 2010 against Turkish humanitarian supplies to 
Gaza-Strip for Hamas182 that ended up in 10 human casualties. However, restoration 
seems to be fragile since President Erdoğan’s last declarations (November 2016) for 
resembling the aforementioned Gaza incident with the atrocities of Hitler during 
World War II. 
Regarding Cyprus, Turkish policy of contentions and claims escalated since 
1970s to end up in the 1974 Turkish invasion and conquest of the northern part of 
the island of Cyprus which was divided by the “Atilla line”. This was the calculated183 
Turkish response to the Greek Cypriots’ petition to be unified with Greece since 
1931184. The invasion was followed by the establishment of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, namely a self-declared state recognized only by Turkey. This state 
was condemned by the international community which recognizes the northern part 
of Cyprus as territory of the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus185. In the years that passed 
since 1974 Cyprus became (in May 2004) a member of the European Union that can 
exercise the right of veto to oppose Turkey’s entry in the EU186, but still, the issue of 
the illegal conquest of northern Cyprus has not been resolved. In January 12, 2017, 
the Geneva Conference that was held under the auspices of United Nations has been 
a minor step towards resolution and simultaneously another indication of 
fundamental differences between Cypriots and Turks on issues such as, territorial 
space, role of the guarantors, type of governance of the island, etc. 
In 2010 the United States Geological Survey (USGS) made an announcement 
for an estimated discovery of 345 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves in eastern 
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Mediterranean and in December 28, 2011 Cyprus verified natural gas findings of 5-8 
trillion cubic feet and its decision to exploit the reserves jointly with Israel187. Rivalry 
broke among riparian states for contesting over the exploitation of the reserves. 
Turkey had already extended its EEZ to a limit that it overlaps with the EEZ of 
Cyprus188, and rejected the legitimacy of the EEZ agreements of Cyprus189. On 
October 2014 Turkey dispatched the “Barbaros” vessel to enter the Cyprus’ EEZ to 
conduct surveys of the subsea190. Turkey claims that Cyprus has no right to exploit its 
natural resources without its (Turkish) permission and before the Cypriot issue is 
resolved. In response, the Republic of Cyprus demands the reunification of the island 
before any sharing of gas revenues can be discussed191. East-Med’s route through 
Cyprus and Greece is not supported by the US that prefers a connection of the 
reserves through Turkey (namely through an alternative route from the original) and 
argue for “equity” instead for “equidistance”192.   
Until today, under the UNCLOS, Greece has signed a delimitation agreement 
on continental shelf with Italy (signed in May 24, 1977193) and, has participated in the 
delimitation agreements on the exclusive economic zone that Cyprus signed with 
Egypt in February 17, 2003, which was renewed in April 19, 2004 for an equal share 
of economic waters. By their 29th April 2014 joint declaration Greece, Cyprus and 
Egypt re-demarked their maritime borders and agreed on joint amendments, should 
there be any194. Finally, Cyprus signed EEZ agreements with Lebanon in January 17, 
2007, and with Israel in December 17, 2010195.  
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In order for the exploitation of the Israeli reserves to be attained and the 
unobstructed construction and operation of East-Med to be done, Greece, Cyprus, 
Egypt and Israel should jointly form a coalition for geopolitical cooperation on 
economic and military issues. Greece should also delimit its EEZ without unilaterally 
declaring it, in order not come up against legal considerations.  
 
X.- CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present study envisaged in presenting the past and the present 
geopolitical relations between Greece and its neighbour countries in eastern 
Mediterranean. Unfortunately, the limited extent of the thesis did not enable the 
writer to make a profound investigation of all related aspects, some of which are the 
emerging importance of a Greek-Cypriot alliance with Egypt and Israel, the American 
perspective relations with Greece under the leadership of the newly elected 
President Donald Trump and how they may impact on East-Med, the Russian attitude 
for the project, its interests for the region after the melting of the ice in the North 
Pole due to climate change and the opening of new sea exits for Russian trade, the 
geopolitical interests of the US in the Middle East energy reserves, the Iranian 
resources and how feasible it is that they access Europe.  
History entails that the significance of East-Med for European energy security 
will probably replenish old tensions and hostilities challenging peace and stability, as 
the balance of powers will eventually change in favour of Cyprus and Greece. The 
latter should “decouple” their foreign policy from old haunted strategies that 
constrained them into defensive manipulation against neighbouring threats. Strategic 
coalitions, the delimitation of the Greek EEZ, the synergy of the Greek and Cypriot 
academic community for common foreign policymaking with a long-term perspective, 
are some suggestions that will bear positive results in the very near future. 
Turkey’s specific gravity as a factor of stability and peace has been impaired. For 
the time being it cannot be considered as a reliable partner for secure investments as 
the one of the magnitude of the Eastern-Mediterranean pipeline. Internal conflicts 
with Kurdish minorities and terrorist attacks on Turkish soil are practical indicators of a 
destabilizing situation which despite appearances, it is highly unlikely that it can be 
controlled by the Turkish government. Therefore, both the construction and the 
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operation of the project will probably be under constant official or extremist threat for 
unpredictable flow interruption of gas transmission with immense financial impacts on 
the investors.  
On the other hand, Greece is a peaceful and democratic country whose 
energy gas needs is much less than Turkey’s (therefore more gas will be available for 
the EU in case the pipeline is constructed according to its original course), whose 
main problem is the on-going economic recession. Apart from a controversial political 
strategy that keeps stalling its economic recovery, it maintains good relations with its 
EU partners and respects European and international law and order. During the last 
decade all Greek governments, independently of ideological background, have 
acknowledged the significance of East-Med and have official supported its 
construction.  
In conclusion, Greece combines the geostrategic position, the political will, 
the legal background, and the technical ability to become an energy gas hub for 
Europe.  
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